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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CENTURIAN CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
A. L. CRIPPS and WALTER 
CRIPPS, 
Defendant and Respondents. 
PETTY MOTOR LEASE, INC., 
Plaintiff In Intervention, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
CENTURIAN CORPORATION, 
RICHARD NICKLES and 
MARGARET K. NICKLES, 
Defendants in Intervention, 
Appellants. 
SUPREME COURT No. 16971 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AND CROSS-APPELLANT 
PETTY MOTOR LEASE, INC. 
NATURE OF CASE 
Centurian Corporation ("Centurian") brought an action 
against A. L. Cripps and Walter A. Cripps ("Cripps"), claiming 
amounts due under an agreement wherein Centurian Corporation 
had given possession of a tank trailer to Cripps. Petty Motor 
Lease, Inc. moved to intervene in the action, claiming an in-
terest in the tank trailer, having entered into agreements with 
Centur ian and Richard Nickles and Margaret K. Nickles ("Nick-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
les") entitled Lease and Agreement of Sale and Purchase. The 
motion to intervene was granted. Trial was held July 13, 1976. 
The trial court, in a memorandum decision and the judgment, 
entered a judgment in favor of Centurian Corporation against 
Cripps and held that it was without jurisdiction of the com-
plaint of Petty Motor Lease against the Defendants in Interven-
tion, Centur ian Corporation, Richard Nickles and Margaret K. 
Nickles. 
In Centurian Corporation v. A. L. Cripps, et al., 
Petty Motor Lease, Inc. v. Centurian Corporation, et al., 577 
P.2d 955 (Utah 1978), this Court reversed the order of the Dis-
trict Court denying jurisdiction of the complaint of Petty 
Motor Lease, Inc. against the Defendants in Intervention, Cen-
turian and Nickles. This Court held and stated as follows: 
We hold that the matter of intervention was pro-
perly before the Court and that it was error for the 
Court to rule as it did. 
This matter is reversed and remanded to the Dis-
trict Court for Salt Lake County with instructions to 
enter judgment in accordance with the evidence pre-
sented at trial in the actions relating to both 
files. We leave it to the discretion of the Court as 
to whether it should open the case and take further 
evidence in this matter. 
On remand, judgment was entered April 9, 1979 in favor 
of Petty Motor Lease, Inc. against Centurian and Nickles. The 
previous judgment in favor of Centurian against Cripps was af-
firmed. Petty Motor Lease, Inc., Centurian and Nickles sought 
additional relief of the District Court by way of motions to 
amend, but such motions were denied. 
( 2) 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent and Cross-Appellant, Petty Motor Lease, 
Inc., prays that the judgment of the Di3trict Court be affirmed 
as to the liability of Centurian and the Nickles, but that the 
amount of such liability be corrected, that the rate of inter-
est applicable to the amounts due Petty Motor Lease, Inc. be 
corrected, and for an award of attorneys fees subsequent to the 
first trial of this matter, including fees on appeal, fees in-
curred after the remand of the case to the District Court, and 
attorney's fees in the present appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In February 1973, Petty Motor Lease, Inc. entered into 
agreements with Centur ian and Nickles regarding a 1973 Trans-
liner semi-tank trailer. The agreements consisted of a Lease 
(Exhibit 7-I) and an Agreement of Sale and Purchase (Exhibit 
8-I) . Several of the provisions of the Lease are pertinent, 
but because of the length of the Lease, those provisions are 
not quoted here. The Lease was executed by Centurian Corpora-
tion and Petty Motor Lease, Inc. and was guaranteed by Richard 
Nickles and Margaret K. Nickles. The Agreement of Sale and 
Purchase provides as follows: 
This agreement made and entered into between 
Petty Motor Lease, Inc., hereinafter called "Owner"; 
and Centur ian Corpora ti on, hereinafter called "User"; 
to-wit: 
1. User has leased from Owner a 1973 Trans-liner 
semi-tank trailer, serial number 151472, and desires 
to purchase said unit at the termination of lease, 
after all payments called for by the lease have been 
paid, and the Owner desires to sell unit to User at 
that time. 
( 3) 
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2. , It is agreed that the User will pay to the 
Owner the sum of Six Hundred Twenty One and 00/100 
Dollars, plus applicable sales tax and interest at six 
percent per annum ( 6%) , plus any deposits or advance 
paym~nts made and Owner shall keep all payments made 
or monies paid or deposited under the terms of the 
lease referred to above. 
3. This agreement is binding upon both parties. 
The Agreement of Sale and Purchase was executed by Centur ian 
Corporation and Petty Motor Lease, Inc. and guaranteed by 
Richard Nickles. 
Centur ian received and took possession of the trailer 
on or about February 1, 1973 (Finding 5, R. 196). 
At the trial of the claim of Centurian Corporation 
against Cripps, Richard Nickles, President of Centurian, testi-
tied as follows: 
Q. (By Mr. Brown) Mr. Nickles are you familiar with a 
tank trailer similar to this one? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you purchase this particular tank trailer new? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. What was the purchase price new? 
A. Approx}mately $18,000. 
Q. • When did you purchase the unit? I should have 
asked that. 
A. Gosh, its been so many years I forgot. 
Q. Is it 1973? 
A. January. 
Q. Would you have purchased that unit say thirty days 
prior to that time? 
( 4) 
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A. No, I purchased it on the first of February. This is 
wher:t we negotiated the agreement when we bought the 
equipment. (Tr. 12, 13; R. 244, 245) 
In May, 1973, Centurian entered into an agreement with 
Cripps regarding the trailer {Finding 6, R. 196). The Agree-
ment (Exhibit 1-P) refers to Centurian as "Seller" and Cripps 
as "Purchaser". Attached to the Agreement are a copy of the 
Lease and a duplicate original of the Agreement of Sale and 
Purchase between Petty Motor Lease and Centurian. 
Shortly thereafter, Cripps leased the trailer to P.I.E. 
(Finding 7, R. 196). In December, 1973, Centurian notified 
P.I.E. to ground the trailer. P.I.E., acting on the request of 
Centurian Corporation, grounded the trailer. Because of the 
conduct of Centurian, Cripps lost their lease with P.I.E. and 
were effectively prevented from using the trailer to obtain 
earnings from which to pay Centurian. Cripps were unable to 
lease or register the trailer for the year 1974 (Finding 11, R. 
196-97). 
Centurian Corporation made payments to Petty Motor 
Lease pursuant to the Lease for the first twelve payments 
thereof due through February, 1974. Centurian made no payments 
required by the Lease after March, 1974 (Finding 8, R. 196). 
On or about March 15, 1974, the trailer was stolen. On March 
29, 1974, Walter Cripps reported the theft (Ex. 4-P) (Finding 
10, R. 196). Exhibit 3-P indicates that on April 4, 1974, the 
location of the trailer was known by the New Mexico State 
Police. Exhibit 3 was mailed April 8, 1974 and postmarked 
April 9, 1974. 
(5) 
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The pertinent conclusions of law of the District Court 
are as follows: 
1. The Lease and Agreement of Sale and Purchase, 
construed together, constitute an agreement of sale and 
purchase, and include all of the terms of the Lease insofar 
as consistent with ·the Agreement of Sale and Purchase. 
Centurian Corporation was obligated to perform the provi-
sions of the Lease and thereupon purchase the trailer. 
Centurian Corporation breached its obligations thereunder. 
2. Centurian Corporation received possession of the 
trailer and accepted delivery thereof. Upon said receipt, 
the risk of loss, as between Petty Motor Lease, Inc. and 
Centurian Corporation, passed to Centurian Corporation. 
3. Petty Motor Lease, Inc. is entitled to the amount 
which it would have received had the Lease and Agreement of 
Sale and Purchase been per formed, namely, (a) the remaining 
twenty lease payments at $580, or $11, 600, together with 
sales tax and interest at the rate of six percent per annum 
from the date of theft of the trailer in the amount of 
$3,512 to the date of judgment, and (b) $621, together with 
sales tax and interest at the rate of six percent per annum 
from February 6, 1973, in the amount of $229 to the date of 
judgment, and (c) less the amount deposited by Centurian 
Corporation with Petty Motor Lease, Inc., $3,594.63. Petty 
Motor Lease, Inc. is entitled to the sum of $12,367.37, 
together with sales tax at the applicable rate at the time 
of payment. 
5. Petty Motor Lease, Inc. is entitled to its rea-
sonable attorney's fees. A reasonable sum to be awarded 
Petty Motor Lease, Inc. for the use and benefit of its 
attorney is the sum of $540. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE LEASE (EXHIBIT 7-I) AND THE AGREEMENT OF SALE 
AND PURCHASE (EXHIBIT 8-I) CONSTITUTE A CONTRACT OF SALE. 
The Agreement of Sale and Purchase specifically refers 
to the Lease and clearly expresses the parties' intentions. It 
provides that Centurian desires to purchase the trailer at the 
termination of the Lease and that Petty Motor Lease desires to 
sell the trailer. The Agreement further provides Centurian ~il! 
( 6) 
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pay a specified amount to complete the purchase and sale to 
which both parties expressed their intention. The Lease and 
Agreement of Sale and Purchase,·- viewed together, clearly re-
quire Centurian to make the payments and perform the other ob-
ligations required by the Lease, and thereupon pay $621, with 
six percent interest thereon, to buy the trailer. 
The construction of a contract requires the ascertain-
ment of the intent and purpose of the contract. The intentions 
of the parties are controlling and normally those intentions 
are determined from the written contract. This rule is stated 
in Mark Steel Corporation v. Eimco Corporation, 548 P.2d 892 
(Utah 1976): 
The primary rule in interpreting a contract is to 
determine what the parties intended by what they 
said. We do not add, ignore or discard words in this 
process; but attempt to render certain the meaning of 
the provision in dispute by an objective and reason-
able construction of the whole contract. (Footnote 
omitted. ) 
The agreements are clear and free of ambiguity. The District 
Court's construction of the documents was objective and reason-
able. The decision of the District Court is entitled to a pre-
sumption of validity. This Court is required to view the evi-
dence and any inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light 
most favorable to sustaining the decision. Cutler v. Bowen, 
543 P. 2d 1349 (Utah 1975). If there is any ambiguity in the 
agreements (Petty Motor Lease submits there is not), the Dis-
trict court may resort to parol evidence to determine the par-
ties' intentions and eliminate the ambiguity. Big Butte Ranch, 
Inc. v. Holm, 570 P. 2d 690 (Utah 1977); Mathis v. Madsen, 1 
( 7) 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
U. 2d 46, 261 P. 2d 952 (1953}. Richard Nickles' testimony at 
trial clearly indicates that the agreements constituted a pur-
chase: 
Q. Did you £Urchase this particular tank trailer new? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. What was the purchase price new? 
A. Approximately $18,000. 
Q. Would you have purchased that unit say thirty (30} 
days prior to that time? 
A. No, I ~chased it on the first day of February. This 
is when we negotiated the agreement when we bought the 
equipment. (Emphasis added; Tr. 12, 13, R. 244, 245.} 
This clearly establishes that Centurian and Nickles understood 
the arrangement to be a purchase. 
Appellants, without any explanation or reference to 
authority, imply that the Lease and Agreement of Sale and Pur-
chase cons ti tu te an option or a conditional sale. The agree-
ments do not support this theory. The intentions of the par-
ties, Centurian to purchase and Petty Motor Lease to sell, are 
clear. There is no language of option or condition. Centur-
ian's obligation is unconditional. The District COUft correct-
ly construed the agreements as an agreement of sale and pur-
chase. This construction must be affirmed. 
POINT II. THE RISK OF LOSS OF THE TRAILER, BY FIRE, THEFT 
OR OTHERWISE, PASSED TO CENTURIAN CORPORATION UPON ITS 
RECEIPT OF THE TRAILER. 
Centurian Corporation received the semi-tank trailer 
on or about February 1, 1973. When Petty Motor Lease delivered 
possession of the trailer to Centurian Corporation and Centur-
(8} 
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ian Corpora ti on received and accepted delivery, the risk of 
loss passed to Centurian. Chapter 2 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, at Section 70A-2-509(3), provides as follows: 
In any case not within Section (1) [where the 
contract requires or authorizes the seller to ship the 
goods by carrier] or ( 2) [where the goods are held by 
a bailee to be delivered without being moved], the 
risk of loss passes to the buyer on his receipt of the 
goods if the seller is a merchant; otherwise, the risk 
passes to the buyer on tender of delivery. 
Since the buyer, Centur ian Coq>oration, received the trailer, 
it is irrelevant whether the seller, Petty Motor Lease, Inc. , 
is a merchant or not. 
In White Motor Corp. v. Bronx-Westchester White 
Trucks, Inc., 18 u.c.c. Reporting Service 382 (N.Y.S.Ct. 1975), 
the Court, in a case similar to the matter before this Court, 
stated: 
Plaintiff, a manufacturer of trucks, delivered to 
defendant an Autocar truck, pursuant to order by de-
fendant. Plaintiff received a receipt from the mana-
ger of defendant's garage for delivery of the truck. 
It also invoiced the defendant for the agreed price of 
the truck. After the truck was delivered and invoiced 
to defendant and while it was in possession of defen-
dant, it was stolen from defendant's garage. 
As appears from the answer and from the papers 
submitted by defendant, defendant's position is that 
title to the truck was never in its name. This con-
tention is based on the agreement between the parties 
which it is asserted by defendant reserved to plain-
tiff a security title pending payment, or in part that 
title papers were not delivered to defendant until 
after the theft of the truck. The title papers in 
question were the manufacturer's statement of origin 
and assignment of title. 
The questions presented in this case are (1) whe-
ther title to the truck at the time of the theft was 
material, and (2) assuming that the location of title 
as between the parties was material, whether title 
had, or had not, passed to defendant. 
( 9) 
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Under the Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-509, pas-
sage of title is immaterial and the risk of loss is 
upon defendant irrespective of title. Under subdivi-
sion ( 3) the risk of loss passed to the defendant on 
receipt and possession of the truck. (Emphasis added.) 
In Nordstrom, Law of Sales, referring to Section 
2-509, the author states: 
After the contract and after conforming goods have 
been placed in the possess ion of the buyer, the buyer 
bears the risk. (Page 394.) 
Similarly, at Page 405: 
The merchant rule (2-509(3)] conforms to the gen-
eral code policy of placing the risk on the party who 
has control of the goods at the time of their loss. 
Risk does not pass until the buyer has received the 
goods; however, the non-merchant seller can shift the 
risk even though he retains control of the goods -
risk passes when the non-merchant seller tenders 
delivery. (Emphasis in original.) 
The policy behind this rule is to place the risk upon 
the party which controls possession of the goods. That is 
sound policy. Petty Motor Lease had no control over the trail-
er, having delivered possession to Centurian. 
Cen tur ian is obligated to per form the terms of the 
agreements, to pay the amounts required to purchase the trailer. 
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DEDUCTING THE AMOUNT 
OF THE DEPOSIT FROM THE AMOUNTS DUE PETTY MOTOR LEASE. 
The District Court was correct in construing the Lease 
and Agreement of Sale and Purchase together and in its determi-
nation that together they constitute an agreement of sale. (See 
Point I, above.) The integrated agreement required Centurian 
Corporation to make all payments called for by the Lease and 
thereupon to: 
(10) 
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. pay to the owner the sum of Six Hundred TWenty 
One and 00/100 Dollars plus applicable sales tax and 
interest at six percent per annum (6%), plus any depo-
sits or advance payrne~ts mad~ and owner shall kee~! 
~yments made or monies ea1d or deposited under the 
terms of the lease referred to above. (Exhibit 8-I: 
emphasis added.) 
Petty Motor Lease, Inc. is entitled to the remaining 
lease payments (twenty lease payments at $580 equals $11,060), 
plus the amount of the sale and purchase of the trailer ($621) , 
plus applicable sales tax and interest. The trial court en-
tered judgment consistent with the foregoing except that it 
provided for deduction of the deposit made by Centurian Corpor-
ation in the sum of $3,094.63. The Agreement of Sale and Pur-
chase specifically provides that the purchase amount of $621 is 
in addition to any deposit or advance payments made "and owner 
shall keep all payments made or monies deposited under the 
terms of the lease referred to above." From the foregoing pro-
visions of the agreement of sale and purchase, it is clear that 
the trial court erred in deducting the amount of the deposit 
which had been made under the lease. 
POINT IV. THE LEASE PLACES THE RISK OF LOSS ON CENTURIAN. 
Even if the Lease and Agreement of Sale and Purchase 
were construed to be a lease with a condition or option of sale 
and purchase, Centurian Corporation is responsible for the safe 
keeping and return to Petty Motor Lease of the trailer. This 
obligation and liability arises because of (1) the lease agree-
ment and (2) the failure of Centurian Corporation to rebut the 
presumption that the theft was due to its negligence. 
(11) 
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The Lease between Petty Motor Lease, Inc. and Centur-
ian Corporation provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
2. User agrees to deposit with Owner the sum of 
$3,594.63 until all terms of this lease have been 
faithfully performed and the property returned to 
owner in a satisfactory condition, whereupon said de-
posit will be returned to User. However, if User vio-
lates any condition of this agreement, Owner may re-
tain such portion of said deposit as may be necessary 
to compensate Owner for the loss or damage caused by 
such violation, and should the sum deposited be insuf-
ficient to compensate Owner for the loss or damage 
caused by such violation, User agrees to pay the 
deficiency to Owner. 
3. User agrees to continually maintain said 
property in good condition and repair . 
7. Upon expiration or termination of this agree-
ment, User shall surrender the unit to Owner in good 
mechanical condition and repair, with tires having at 
least 50 percent of original tread and free from body 
damage, scratched or chipped paint, or torn or frayed 
upholstery. Any expense by Owner to bring unit to the 
above described condition shall be paid for by User. 
8. If User fails to make payments when due, or 
if User fails to perform any other condition of this 
lease, ... User agrees to pay all costs and expenses 
including reasonable attorney's fees, incurred by 
Owner in enforcement of its rights under this agree-
ment . 
Considering the Lease only, the foregoing provisions clearly 
indicate that the User, Centurian Corporation, was responsible 
for the care, maintenance and return of the trailer. By agree-
ment, Centurian Corporation agreed to be responsible for the 
condition and return of the trailer. As stated at 8 Am.Jur.2d. 
Bailment, Section 200: "It is the general rule that unless made 
so by statute or ~ exeress contract, an ordinary bailee, no 
matter to what class he belongs, is not an insurer of safety of 
( 12) 
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goods delivered into his keeping." (Ernphas is added, footnote 
omitted.) Similarly, in Section 201 the rule is stated: 
Unless a bailee has violated his contract he will 
not be liable in the absence of negligence, for loss 
or injury in respect of the thing bailed, resulting 
from the inherent nature of the property itself or 
some infirmity thereof, from disaster or accidental 
casualty, or from robbery, burglary, or theft. Nor is 
he liable for loss of the property because the process 
of law directed against his bailer, confiscation or 
taking by superior force, the act or negligence of a 
third person, or the negligence or contributory negli-
gence of the bailer, his servants, or agents. Of 
course, such duties and the liability or failure to 
perform them may also be imposed on the bailee by vir-
tue of special contract. The exercise of the required 
degree of care may be found in many instances to an-
ticipate and guard against the occurrence of loss or 
injury, theft, fire, and similar contingencies, and he 
may be held liable for losses proximately resulting 
from a lack of due care in this respect. (Emphasis 
added, footnotes omitted.) 
A bailee is held to his agreement, express or implied, 
even if the agreement exceeds the responsibility created by law. 
As stated at 8 Am.Jur.2d, Bailment, Section 137: 
A bailee may enlarge his legal responsibility for 
the subject of the bailrnent by contract, express or 
implied, even to the extent of making himself abso-
lutely liable as insurer for the loss or destruction 
of goods committed to his care; this is true even of 
gratuitous bailees. As a general rule, if there is an 
express or implied agreement by the bailee which 
clearly goes beyond his ordinary obligation as implied 
by law, he will be held to this agreement. In such 
cases the bailment contract is controlling and must be 
enforced according to its terms, irrespective of the 
fact that a less onerous liability is imposed by law 
on bailees of the same class generally. For such an 
undertaking, the bailment its elf or the compensation 
to be paid for it, is a sufficient consideration. 
As stated by this court in Sumsion v. Streator-Smith, 
Inc., 103 Utah 44, 132 P.2d 680 (1943): 
(13) 
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It is to be noted that in any event [whether the 
bailer pleads trover, in case, or assurnpsit] the bail-
er must prove a duty and the breach of that duty. 
Here, as in the ordinary bailment, that duty rests 
entirely on the bailment contract. 132 P.2d at 683. 
Today, regardless of the type of action brought, 
the entire duty of the bailee with respect to the 
bailed chattel is based on the bailment contract. 132 
P.2d at 685. 
In the §_umsion case, there was no express contract. The plain-
tiff, after damaging his automobile, engaged the defendant to 
take the automobile to the defendant's garage. En route to the 
garage, a loaded coal truck crashed into the rear end of the 
plaintiff's car, causing considerable damage. Regarding the 
contract, this Court stated: 
No express contract was made. It is therefore a 
contract which is implied by law from a conduct of the 
parties. The plaintiff requested that defendant tow 
plaintiff's car to the garage. Defendant agreed to do 
so. Nothing was said concerning the obligation of the 
defendant to return the car. We must, therefore, 
determine what kind of contract the law will imply 
from this conduct. 132 P.2d at 683-684. 
In the pr es en t case, the same rules apply, al though 
the facts are different. The duty of Centurian Corporation 
rests on the agreement of the parties. If the agreement of the 
parties constitutes a lease or a lease with a conditional or 
optional contract of purchase or sale as opposed to an agree-
ment of sale as held by the District Court, the Lease agreement 
(Exhibit 7-I) contains the agreement of the parties. That 
agreement is quoted above and provides that Centurian Corpora-
tion would return the trailer upon termination or expiration of 
the lease. 
(14) 
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Paragraph 2 of the Lease provides that Centur-ian de-
posit a sum to assure performance of the Lease. Paragraph 3 of 
the Lease requires Centurian to maintain the property in good 
condition and repair. Paragraph 7 requires Centurian, upon 
expiration or termination of the Lease, to surrender the trail-
er in good mechanical condition and repair, with tires of 
designated tread, and free from body damage, scratched or chip-
ped paint, and torn or frayed upholstery. These contractual 
provisions conclusively establish the liability of Centurian 
Corporation for the loss of the trailer. Centur ian Corpora-
tion, in its brief, totally ignores the contractual provisions 
between the parties which establish its liability. The rule is 
clearly stated at 8 Am.Jur.2d, Bailment, Section 140, and 
therefore quoted at length: 
An express agreement by the bailee not merely to 
return the subject of the bailment in good condition, 
but to repair all damages occasioned by accident or 
casualty, or to be "responsible" for, or to repair, 
any loss or damage, barring ordinary wear and tear, 
creates an unconditional obligation, and for loss or 
damage not excepted the bailee is liable irrespective 
of his negligence or fault. The bailee becomes an 
insurer also where he enters into a special contract 
to return the property in good condition or to pay its 
value and is liable for any loss which occurs while it 
is in his eossession, even though without his fault. 
And where he contracts specially to return the bailed 
property in as good condition as when received saving 
some other exception or exceptions than ordinary wear 
and tear, such exceptions may be regarded as exclu-
sive, and he may be liable as an insurer for loss from 
other causes, although without his fault. 
The view is generally taken that the fact that 
the bailee deposits a sum of money or gives a bond as 
secur.i ty for the return of the bailrnent in good condi-
tion evidences an intention to extend the common-law 
liability of the bailee. There is, moreover, author-
ity for the view that whenever the bailee is deemed to 
( 15) 
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have entered into a ~ecial engagement to return the 
.e.E.Operty at a certain time in good order, he will not 
be released therefrom even where it appears that the 
e_roperty was dama~d or destroyed without his fault. 
The principle that lies at the foundation of the 
authorities on the question imposing liability, irre-
spective of fault of the bailee where he contracts to 
return the property or be responsible for its loss, is 
that where a party, by his own contract, creates a 
duty or charge upon himself, he is bound to make it 
good notwithstanding any accident by inevitable ne-
cessity, because he must have provided against it by 
his own contract. However, respectable authority 
exists for the proposition that bailees, with or with-
out a special contract, are excused when they show 
loss or injury by an act of God or of public enemies. 
Thieves, tramps and robbers are not deemed to be pub-
lic enemies in the legal sense of those words, so that 
losses occasioned by them do not come within the mean-
ing of such an alleged exception. (Emphasis added, 
footnotes omitted.) 
In conclusion, the Lease clearly places on Centurian the obli-
gation of returning the trailer and, therefore, of assuming the 
risk of loss of the trailer. 
In addition, the law creates a presumption regarding 
the loss of bailed goods after delivery by the bailer to the 
bailee. Once the bailer has shown delivery of the bailed goods 
to the bailee and a failure to return or the return of the 
bailed goods in a damaged condition, the bailee has the burden 
of proof that it was not negligent in the care of the bailed 
goods. This rule is well established and has been followed in 
a number of cases in this state, commencing with Romney v. 
£ovey_g2rage, 100 Utah 167, 111 P. 2d 545 (1941), followed by 
Sumsion v. Streator-Smith, Inc., suera. In Sumsion this court 
stated: 
(16) 
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I~ ~omn~~ Covey Garage, ~~· we held that in 
an action ex del1cto by the bailer against the bailee, 
the ultimate burden of proof at all times remains on 
the bailer, but we further held that he could meet 
this burden in the ordinary bailment case by showing 
the bailment and the failure to return or the return 
in a damaged condition. This showing gave rise to an 
inference of negligence which required the bailee to 
come forward with an explanation to show that the in-
jury or loss was not due to his negligence. Unless 
bailee conclusively proved due care so that a directed 
verdict was required the jury would be allowed to con-
sider both the inference and the evidence so produced 
by the bailee. . 
Ordinarily, under the rule of the Romney_ case, 
supr~, the plaintiff can meet this burden by showing, 
as the plaintiff did here, the bailment and the return 
in a damaged condition. Upon this showing, the law 
arbitrarily raises a presumption of negligence which 
makes a prima facie case for the plaintiff sufficient, 
unless the bailee .conclusively proves due care, to 
carry the case to the jury. . This presumption is 
one of necessity which arises only because of the 
peculiar facts ordinarily present in a bailment case. 
The cases hold that it would be unreasonable to re-
quire the bailer to prove negligence specifically when 
the bailee has exclusive possession of the facts and 
the means for ascertaining them. 
The foregoing rule is also followed in Clack-Nomah Flying Club 
v. Sterlin_9 Aircraft, Inc., 17 U.2d 245, 408 P.2d 904 (1965) 
and Barlow Upholstery & Furniture Co. v. Emmel, 533 P.2d 900 
(Utah 1975). 
Petty Motor Lease, Inc. established its prima facie 
case by establishing delivery of the trailer to Centur ian and 
the failure of Centurian to return the same. Centurian Corpo-
ration failed to meet its burden of proof that it was not ne-
gligent in the loss of the trailer. Furthermore, the District 
Court held that Centurian, in breach of its agreement with 
Cripps, interfered with Cripps' relationship with P. I.E., pre-
venting Cripps from using the trailer. The District Court 
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could have fotind this action negligent on the part of Centur-. 
ian, causing or contributing to the theft of the trailer. 
Therefore, even if the agreement of the parties is construed to 
be solely a lease or a lease with a condition or option, Cen-
turian is nevertheless liable for the loss of the trailer. 
If the agreement of Centurian and Petty Motor Lease is 
determined to be a lease, Centurian would be obligated to Petty 
Motor Lease in an amount in excess of that determined by the 
Trial Court or urged by Petty Motor Lease on appeal. Paragraph 
6 of the Lease provides as follows: 
This Lease may be terminated by User at any time 
during the period of the Lease or, if User violates 
any of the terms of this Agreement, Owner may, without 
notice, terminate this Lease. If this Lease is termi-
nated by either Owner or User for any reason or ex-
pires as provided in paragraph 1, hereof, User agrees 
to pay to Owner any and all past due payments or other 
sums then due under the terms of this lease, includ-
ing, but not limited to, the cost of repairs required 
to bring the property to good condition, plus the 
final lease payment in full, and, in addition thereof, 
to pay 45 percent of the monthly rental multiplied by 
the number of months the Lease has yet to run, which 
sum is to compensate Owner for the greater costs and 
depreciation occurring during the first part of the 
Lease as compared to the last part of the Lease. 
The amount due Petty Motor Lease under the Lease (if the agree-
ment between Petty Motor Lease and Centur ian and is not an 
Agreement of Sale and Purchase) is as follows: $5, 800, repre-
senting 45 percent of the balance due on the Lease as of March 
15, 1973, plus the final Lease payment pursuant to paragraph 6 
of the Lease (twenty Lease payments at $580.00 equals $11,600 x 
45% equals $5, 220, plus final payment of $580 equals $5, 800); 
sales tax on the foregoing amount at the rate of such sales tax 
(18) 
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applicable at the time of receipt of the foregoing amounts: 
interest on $5,800 to the date of judgment; less the deposit in 
the amount of $3,594.63; plus $15,000, the total value of the 
leased vehicle on March 15, 1974. The sum of the foregoing is 
$17,205.37, exclusive of sales tax and interest. 
As to the value of the trailer as of March 15, 1974, 
Richard Nickles testified that in March, 1974 the value was 
$22,000 (Tr. 14). Walter A. Cripps testified that the value of 
the trailer in March, 1974 was between $14,500 and $15,000 (Tr. 
38). Neuman C. Petty, President of Petty Motor Lease, Inc., 
testified that the value of the trailer in March, 1974 was be-
tween $15,000 and $16,000 (Tr. 47). See also Tr. 58, 62. 
Petty Motor Lease claims the amount due under the 
Lease and Agreement of Sale and Purchase is $12, 450, plus in-
terest (see Point V), plus sales tax and attorney's fees. This 
is based on twenty lease payments at $580, or $11,600, the $621 
purchase amount, and $229 interest as provided in the Agreement 
of Sale and Purchase. If this Court determines the interest 
rate applied by the District Court is correct, the amount due 
Petty Motor Lease is $15,962, plus sales tax and attorney's 
fees. This is based upon twenty lease payments at $580, or 
$11,600, interest of $3,512 as determined by the District 
Court, $621 plus $229 as the purchase amount with interest at 
six percent per annum as provided in the Agreement of Sale and 
Purchase. There should be no deduction for the deposit (see 
Point III). 
(19) 
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Appellants rely on paragraph 5 of the Lease in an at-
tempt to absolve them from liability. Paragraph 5 provides: 
5. User agrees to maintain during the term of 
this lease not less than $25, 000 property damage in-
surance and $100, 000/$300, 000 public liability insur-
ance, which insurance shall provide protection for 
Owner and user. The ( ) agrees to main-
tain during the term of this lease, fire, theft, com-
prehensive and $100 deductible collision insurance on 
the above described property, which insurance shall 
provide protection for Owner and User as their inter-
est may appear. In case of damage User agrees to pay 
the first $100 of the cost of replacement or repairs 
and all damage not covered by such insurance. Owner 
may have in effect at the commencement of this lease, 
fire, theft, comprehensive and $100 deductible colli-
sion insurance. If User furnishes Owner with evidence 
of satisfactory insurance coverage within fifteen days 
from the commencement of the lease, Owner's insurance 
policy shall be terminated with no expense to User. 
However, if evidence of satisfactory insurance cover-
age has not been furnished by User within fifteen days 
of the commencement of this lease, User shall pay to 
Owner the total premium under such insurance policy of 
Owner and that policy may be kept in full force and 
effect during the term of this lease. In addition, 
User specifically agrees to defend and hold harmless 
Owner from any claim or liability whatsoever arising 
from the use of the property herein leased during the 
term of this lease, including Owner's negligence. 
Should User now or in the future become an "assigned 
risk" or should a higher than average insurance prem-
ium otherwise be required, and if Owner has herein 
agreed to maintain insurance coverage, User agrees to 
pay any additional premium upon demand. 
There was no reference to User or Owner in the blank provided 
in the second sentence as to which party would maintain fire, 
theft, and comprehensive insurance. This can be interpreted in 
two ways: (1) that the reference to User in the first sentence 
would apply to the second, or ( 2) that the parties made no 
agreement. In either event, the obligation of insurance is not 
imposed on Petty Motor Lease. Further, contrary to the asser-
tion of Appellants, the use of the form by Petty Motor Lease 
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does not mean Petty Motor Lease assumed the risk by leaving the 
line blank. Both parties signed the Lease and had equal oppor-
tunity to insert a name on the line. 
Appellants also claim Margaret Nickles did not guaran-
tee the Agreement of Sale and Purchase. This would mean that 
Margaret Nickles should not be liable for the $621 purchase 
amount and interest thereon of $229, or a total of $850. In 
all other respects, Margaret Nickles is liable in the same 
amount as Centurian and Richard Nickles. 
POINT V. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AWARD IN:; INTEREST IN 
PARAGRAPH 3(a) OF ITS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AT THE RATE OF SIX 
PERCENT (6%) PER ANNUM. 
follows: 
Paragraph 8 of the Lease provides in pertinent part as 
8. If User fails to make payments when due, or 
refuses or fails to perform any other conditions of 
this Lease, User agrees to pay all costs and 
expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees, in-
curred by owner in enforcement of its rights under 
this agreement and agrees to pay interest at the high-
est rate allowed by law upon all amounts not paid when 
due. (Emphasis added.) 
The District Court, in its Conclusions of Law, awarded interest 
at the rate of six percent per annum on the payments due under 
the Lease. The question raised is: What is the interest rate 
contemplated by the terms "highest rate allowed by law"? This 
language is to be distinguished from "the highest legal rate." 
Prior to the enactment of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code in 
1969, the State of Utah had a usury statute which precluded 
charging interest rates in excess of certain specified rates. 
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code repealed the usury statutes. 
( 21) 
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Section 708-9-103, Utah Code Ann. In the place of the usury 
statutes, the Uniform Consumer Credit Code established maximum 
interests rates on certain types of loans. Section 708-3-201 
(1) provides: 
With respect to a consumer loan other than a 
supervised loan . . , a lender may contract for and 
receive a loan finance· charge, calculated according to 
the actuarial method, not exceeding 18 percent per 
year on the unpaid balances of the principal. 
Although the agreements between Petty Motor Lease and Centurian 
are not claimed to be a consumer loan, the foregoing provision 
establishes what was anticipated by the parties to be the high-
est rate allowed by law. The Uniform Consumer Credit Code 
abolished the usury statute and replaced it with a statute 
which provided for interest at 18 percent per annum on certain 
consumer 
1 loans. Similarly, Article II of the Uniform Con-
sumer Credit Code involves credit sales. Section 708-2-201 ( 2) 
provides: 
The credit service charge, calculated according 
to the actuarial method, may not exceed the equivalent 
of the greater of either of the following: 
(a) the total of (3 different interest rates 
applied on unpaid balances at various 
levels]; or 
(b) 18 percent per year on the unpaid balances 
of the amount financed. 
lThe Uniform Consumer Credit Code eliminated the usury 
statute and provided no maximum interest rate as to loans made 
to an organization other than a natural person. Section 708-
3-605 provides: "With respect to a loan other than a consumer 
loan or a consumer related loan, the parties may contract for 
the payment by the debtor of any loan finance charge." 
(22) 
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Because the Uniform Consumer Credit Code abolished the 
usury statutes and replaced them with the foregoing provisions, 
the parties anticipated interest at the rate of 18 percent per 
annum. Petty Motor Lease submits that the applicable rate of 
interest, based upon the intent of the parties, is the rate of 
18 percent per annum. 
POINT VI. PETTY MOTOR LEASE SHOULD BE AWARDED ITS 
ATTORNEY'S FEES IN ALL PROCEEDINGS SINCE THE TRIAL. 
Paragraph 8 of the Lease provides: 
If User fails to make payments when due, or if 
User fails to perform any other condition of this 
Lease, ... User agrees to pay all costs and expenses 
including reasonable attorney's fees incurred by Owner 
in enforcement of its rights in this agreement and 
agrees to pay interest at the highest rate allowed by 
law on all monies not paid when due. 
At the trial of this matter, Petty Motor Lease claimed 
an attorney's fee of $540 for time expended through trial (Tr. 
54). Since the trial, Petty Motor Lease has been required to 
appeal the original judgment of the Court, sought entry of 
judgment after this Court remanded the case to the District 
Court, from June 2, 1978, until judgment was entered on April 
9, 1979. Thereafter, the motions to amend of Petty Motor Lease 
and Centurian were denied on February 22, 1980. See Record, 
pages 171-210. Further, Petty Motor Lease has been involved in 
this appeal. 
Attorney's fees on appeal are discretionary with the 
Supreme Court. Swain v. Salt Lake Real Estate & Investment 
Co., 3 u.2d 121, 279 P.2d 709 (1955); see also Bates v. Bates, 
560 P.2d 706 (1977). Petty Motor Lease submits that it is en-
(23) 
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titled to an award of attorney's fees to compensate it for the 
employment of its attorney in these proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the District Court as to the 
liability of Centur ian and the Nickles, and should modify the 
judgment so as not to deduct the deposit made to Petty Motor 
Lease. This Court should also award interest as stated in 
Point V and attorney's fees, to be determined by the District 
Court, as stated in Point VI. 
DATED this 18th day of July, 1980. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MOYLE & DRAPER 
By 
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Wayne G. Petty 
Attorney for Appellant 
600 Deseret Plaza 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111 
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